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Abstract
Most of the current anti money launder-
ing (AML) systems, using handcrafted
rules, are heavily reliant on existing struc-
tured databases, which are not capable
of effectively and efficiently identifying
hidden and complex ML activities, es-
pecially those with dynamic and time-
varying characteristics, resulting in a high
percentage of false positives. Therefore,
analysts1 are engaged for further inves-
tigation which significantly increases hu-
man capital cost and processing time. To
alleviate these issues, this paper presents
a novel framework for the next gener-
ation AML by applying and visualiz-
ing deep learning-driven natural language
processing (NLP) technologies in a dis-
tributed and scalable manner to augment
AML monitoring and investigation. The
proposed distributed framework performs
news and tweet sentiment analysis, en-
tity recognition, relation extraction, en-
tity linking and link analysis on differ-
ent data sources (e.g. news articles and
tweets) to provide additional evidence to
human investigators for final decision-
making. Each NLP module is evaluated
on a task-specific data set, and the over-
all experiments are performed on synthetic
and real-world datasets. Feedback from
AML practitioners suggests that our sys-
tem can reduce approximately 30% time
and cost compared to their previous man-
ual approaches of AML investigation.
1One of our banking clients has about 10,000 analysts
globally to investigate over 400,000 red-alerted transactions
weekly. With the data privacy and non-disclosure agreement,
we are not entitled to release any clients’ or entities’ names.
1 Introduction
Money laundering (ML) is the process of transfer-
ring criminal and illegal proceeds into ostensibly
legitimate assets, and it has long been considered
as the world’s third largest “industry”. ML is of-
ten associated with terrorism financing, drug and
human trafficking, so that it is a severe threat to
the stability and security of the economy and pol-
itics globally. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimates that the aggregate size of ML in
the world could be somewhere between 2% and
5% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
which is equivalent to $590 billion to $3.2 trillion
USD approximately. The annual growth rate of
the volume of illicit funds traveling through ML
channels is estimated as 2.7% (Jorisch, 2009).
AML is one of the long-standing challenges
in the financial sector. A number of systematic
frameworks have been proposed for AML sys-
tems (Gao and Xu, 2007; Gao and Ye, 2007;
Gao and Xu, 2010; Gombiro and Jantjies, 2015)
following a multi-stage procedure with data de-
scription and transaction evaluation approaches.
Moreover, several techniques have been applied
in this area: rule-based, link-analysis and risk-
classification/scoring-based methods.
In the traditional AML system, financial trans-
actions are consistently monitored using complex
rules and thresholds to identify suspicious ML pat-
terns and generate red alerts, e.g. unexpected high
amounts or high frequent transactions. These rules
are rigid and restrictive to ensure the blockage
of ML transactions, resulting in a high amount
of false positives (transactions blocked by mis-
take) (Pellegrina et al., 2009; Helmy et al., 2014).
Consequently, a significant amount of human re-
sources (reviewers/analysts) are engaged to ap-
prove or block such red-alerted transactions. This
manual validation process is mainly a consultation
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procedure which involves gathering intelligence
information from different sources about the par-
ties involved in a red-alerted transaction. More-
over, the manual process of gathering intelligence
involves: (1) news search; (2) name screening; and
(3) consultation of existing fraud database or crim-
inal records to determine if any of the parties has a
criminal record, fraud offense, or some other sus-
picious activities. The main drawbacks of most of
current AML systems are: (1) a high volume of
red ML alerts forces organizations to increase the
amount of investigation costs in terms of time and
human effort; (2) yet fewer ML alerts result in a
limited number of checks, which heavily affects
the recall of the system by allowing the suspicious
transaction to pass through the compliance proce-
dure (Gao et al., 2006); Several global banking or-
ganizations were heavily fined by AML regulators
for ineffective AML practices (Martin, 2017).
We propose a novel framework that can drasti-
cally decrease the time and effort of false positive
validation (FPV) for AML solutions. We harness
multiple data sources, and apply deep learning-
based NLP techniques within a distributed archi-
tecture to create a recommendation system to sup-
port human analysts for a more efficient and ac-
curate decision-making. The salient contributions
of this paper include: (1) Harnessing heteroge-
neous open data (e.g. social media, news articles
and fraud bases) in AML compliance to make it
more robust and updated; (2) Using different lev-
els of sentiment analysis (SA) to identify negative
evidence of a target entity; (3) Using name entity
recognition (NER) and relation extraction (RE) to
build the relation network of a target entity, and
analyze the hidden and complex connections be-
tween the target entity and existing suspicious en-
tities from the fraud bases; and (4) developing a
distributed communication architecture for scaling
the deployment of various NLP modules.
To the best of our knowledge, harnessing un-
structured social and news content to facilitate the
investigation and compliance has never been at-
tempted in the recent literature of AML, nor any
industrial systems.
2 System Architecture
The proposed novel AML framework follows a
distributed architecture to integrate different deep
learning-based NLP modules to facilitate the in-
vestigations of suspicious ML transactions. The























Figure 1: Architecture of the novel AML frame-
work.
The system follows an extensible micro-service
oriented distributed architecture where each com-
ponent acts as a separate micro-service and com-
municates with others via an Advanced Message
Queuing Protocol (AMQP) platform. AMQP is
an open standard application layer protocol used
for queuing and routing messages between the ser-
vices in a secure and reliable way2. Communi-
cations between the components are chained to
achieve incremental data processing. This archi-
tecture also supports dynamic routing topologies.
In this framework, each AML component is
independently configurable, deployable, scalable
and replaceable which makes it flexible on where
and how to run it. Thus, it can conveniently dis-
tribute the AML components over a cluster of ma-
chines where allocation of resources could be ad-
justed on demand depending on the needs regard-
ing the processing time or memory consumption.
In Figure 1, the User Interfaces (UI) connect to
the reporting service that provides the results in-
formation from the database (DB). The UI can also
trigger the processing pipeline, calling the report-
ing service to make the gateway start processing
data regarding new transactions.
The reporting service provides representational
state transfer (REST) endpoints for the interaction
between the UI and the system. This service al-




lated to a specific transaction and the set of pro-
cessed results that will lead to the human analyst
to approve or block this transaction.
The information processing pipeline is a com-
bination of different modules (micro-services) via
different routings. Different routings encapsulate
different customized functionalities for the end
user. Using the route configuration file, the route
is embedded in the message that is passed around,
so the component knows where it should direct the
message next.
In this architecture, the data layer is constructed
using Cassandra, Neo4j and MySQL along with
news and Twitter engines to govern, collect, man-
age and store various type of data (e.g. banking
data and open data). The data layer maintains a
bidirectional access with other modules in the sys-
tem. Two types of data are handled in the data
layer: banking and open data. Banking data refers
to a wide variety of financial data, for example:
data related to Know Your Customer (KYC), client
profiles, customer accounts, and real-time transac-
tions. On the other hand open data refers to finan-
cial news articles, social media, financial report,
existing and open source fraud base etc.
3 Work-flow and Functionalities
The main UI of our system is shown in Figures 2–
4. We will explicitly detail the functionality of
each NLP module while following the work-flow
of the system:
Figure 2: Sentiment Analysis of Target Entity
The system starts with transaction monitoring
(TM) that identifies suspicious transaction using
complex rules and generates red alerts. Suspicious
transactions are flagged and reside in a queue for
further investigation. Information such as name,
location, account details of the parties (involved in
a flagged) are extracted for further usage.
The name screening module filters out ML
offenders or criminals have previous records of
fraud, illegal activities (e.g. terrorism) and fi-
nancial crimes by looking at a sanction list or
ML cases from bank records and other fraud
bases. The name screening employs fuzzy match-
ing techniques as an initial filter like many off-the-
self AML solutions. If the target entity is matched
with some entities in the list, it will increase the
probability of a ML transaction, so the system is
triggered for more evidence gathering.
Figure 3: Knowledge Graph of Fraud Base: Each
Node is an entity and edges are relations. Sensitive
entities are blocked with white boxes according to
data privacy agreement.
The target entity with its properties are stored
in a knowledge graph (KG) which is con-
structed from a combination of publicly available
fraud/ML bases3. Figure 3 shows part of the KG,
where each node represents an entity and the edge
represents a relation. Persons and organizations
that occur in this KG and are red-alerted by the
TM system, are strongly considered to be involved
in illegal activities. Entity disambiguation is used
when the the query of the target entity to the KG
is to be made. If the target entity is matched, then
we directly submit the evidence to human inves-
tigators. The system also considers human judg-
ment in this process, mainly for two reasons: (1)
Often fake identities, aliases are captured by ana-
lyzing the neighbors of the target entities (e.g. the
associate entities remain same) (2) Often indirect
connection to a suspicious entity validates the ML
claim of a transaction.
Sentiment Analysis is a key module of our sys-






as a parallel component for evidence mining. At
any given point of time the module starts fetching
data from different sources, such as news sources
and social media in order to find clues of the tar-
get entity, after that it analyses the sentiment of
collected news and other data sources and projects
the results into a geo-graph and a time-series chart
to identify geo and temporal patterns. The goal
of this module is to identify potential negative ev-
idence involving crime, fraud and ML etc. As
shown in Figure 2, the results are visualized with
the time-stamp to reveal the trend. The idea behind
viewing the sentiment over time is that continu-
ously growing negative enduring sentiment for an
entity indicates something suspicious and the ne-
cessity of in-depth investigation. In Figure 2, Red
indicates the negative sentiment, Green represents
the positive sentiment, and Yellow is the average
sentiment of target entity’s competitors. Blue is
the averaged sentiment from Twitter data. It can be
seen that negative sentiment regarding to financial
fraud is dominant for the target entity, and hence
an in-depth investigation is necessary. The news
are complied and presented along with the graph
so that the actual content can also be presented.
Geographical distribution in terms of sentiment re-
garding the target entity is also visualized, which
reflects the risks of the target entity involved in the
ML activities in terms of location.
Figure 4: Knowledge Graph from News Article
The next part of our system is designed to per-
form entity resolution and linking through NER,
RE, link analysis (LA). NER and RE are per-
formed over collected unstructured negative news
data to extract relational facts in real time and
build an entity-specific KG regarding the target
entity as shown in Figure 4. Subsequently, these
entity-specific KGs are merged with the existing
knowledge graph by entity linking. In this process,
an entity disambiguation technique is also used to
find out the same entity with different mentions.
Given the updated KG, we then carry out inspec-
tion and reasoning regarding the suspicious entity
considering that a direct or indirect connection be-
tween a target entity and any number of existing
ML/fraud entities. Direct and indirect connections
can be a strong evidence implying that the inves-
tigated transaction might be illegal. This process
not only serves evidence mining for a particular
suspicious transaction but also enriches the exist-
ing KB continuously by adding a large number of
entities that are collected from different sources.
Finally, for a suspicious transaction, confidence
scores are generated along with evidences from
each module: TM, fraud-base name screening,
fraud KB matching, SA trend and entity disam-
biguation module. The scores are normalized
within a range of 0.00 to 1.00 for each module
and are presented to a user. Based on these scores,
the user approves, blocks or transfers the transac-
tion to higher authorities for action. The goal of
our solution is not to replace human compliance
personnels, but to augment their capability and to
make a more accurate decision efficiently.
4 NLP Models
In this section, we introduce the modeling details
for each NLP modules in our system.
4.1 Sentiment Analysis
Sentiment analysis is a task of identifying the po-
larity of sentiment (e.g. positive, neutral or neg-
ative) in a content at different levels, e.g. term,
aspect, sentence and document.
For our AML task, we develop two different SA
models, namely the document-level and sentence-
level models. The former is a multi-channel con-
volutional neural network (CNN) based sentiment
classifier (Kim, 2014) and used to process finan-
cial news articles; the latter is also a CNN based
model (Tang et al., 2014; Deriu et al., 2016) for
social media data.
One challenge for the document-level SA model
is that annotated resources in the financial domain
are hard to obtain. To solve this problem, we pro-
pose a voting scheme to label the training data as
follows: Financial news are gathered using a list of
keywords4 and news search APIs, afterwards they
4https://www3.nd.edu/˜mcdonald/Word_
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(headlines and the first paragraph of a news) go
through some public sentiment APIs to generate
the sentiment score. Finally, a voting mechanism
is used to obtain the final result in terms of posi-
tive or negative sentiment for each document. Our
document-level SA classifier, trained on automatic
labeled 12,467 of such financial news articles, and
it achieves 76.96% in terms of accuracy compared
to a public sentiment API5 on the RT-polarity6
data set. With respect to the Twitter SA classi-
fier, it is trained and evaluated on SemEval-2016
task 47 data set, and achieves 63.10% in terms of
accuracy, comparable to the best system (63.30%)
in the shared task. Different from previous shared
tasks, the SemEval-2016 task 4 is designed to es-
timate the percentage of tweets that are positive
and the percentage of tweets that are negative in
a given set of tweets about a topic. Thus, in this
circumstance, this dataset is very helpful for us to
verify our SA models for AML scenario because
in one period there might have many tweets dis-
cussing a suspicious entity (e.g. an organisation).
4.2 Relation Extraction
Relation extraction involves the prediction of se-
mantic relations between pairs of nominals or en-
tities in a sentence (Bunescu and Mooney, 2005).
We use the pipeline modeling methods for rela-
tion extraction tasks, i.e. recognising and disam-
biguating named entities (Wang et al., 2012) first,
and then performing relation extraction on these
recognised entities. NER is performed using a
combined strategy: (1) Stanford NER Recognizer;
(2) a neural NRE which is implemented using
a LSTM-CRF framework (Lample et al., 2016);
and (3) we combine the recognised named enti-
ties from these two models, and select out those
that we want based on specific types. Seven dif-
ferent types of named entities are defined in our
system, namely Person, Organisation, Location,
Date, Time, Money and Miscellaneous. Given two
entities and a sentence containing these two enti-
ties, our LSTM-based model predicts the relation
between them. We evaluate it on SemEval 2010
task 8 (Hendrickx et al., 2010) data and it achieves
Lists.html
5We use https://www.ibm.com/watson/





7Prediction of five-point scale polarity of a tweet.
80.62% in terms of macro-F1 measure.
Moreover, to handle multi-instance problem in
the distant supervision RE (i.e. for one entity pair,
there exists multiple instances containing this en-
tity pair, where some instances are valid and some
are noise), we develop an attentive RNN frame-
work (Lin et al., 2016) with a word-level and a
sentence-level attentions for relation prediction,
where the word-level attention can learn lexical
contexts and the sentence-level attention can se-
lect valid instances for relation prediction. We
evaluate our model on the publicly available New
York Time data set and achives 88.00% accuracy
in terms of P@100 measure.
5 Evaluation and Feedbacks from AML
Practitioners
As discussed in above section, different valida-
tion and evaluation methods are applied to dif-
ferent NLP models, where the tweet SA model,
news SA model or attentive RE model achieves
or is comparable to the state-of-the-art in terms of
accuracy. At present, the entire system is at pi-
loting stage with our banking clients across US,
Europe and Asia. It is currently being tested and
evaluated by professional AML practitioners for
AML and KYC investigations. From the feed-
backs that we collected so far, the end users are
optimistic on achieving the objective of reducing
on average 30% of their time of investigating the
red-alerted suspicious transactions and making a
decision more efficiently. We have been invited
to give keynote talks about different aspects (not
the entire one) of this system at highly respected
events, such as World Mobile Conference (WMC)
2018, Europe Financial Information Management
Conference (FIMA) 2017 etc. Worth mention-
ing that some of our NLP models were also uti-
lized by our clients in different domains. For in-
stance, one of our diamond clients adopted our
news and tweets sentiment analysis models for
monitoring their brand reputation. Given the sen-
sitivity of their business, they cannot release the
performance metrics to us. However, their overall
feedback and experience have been very positive.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present a novel distributed frame-
work of applying and visualizing different deep
learning based NLP technologies to augment the
anti money laundering investigation. Our system
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is modularized and distributed which enables it
to be deployed on scale and on demand. Each
component is a micro-service which allows mul-
tiple instances of the same module to be created
and deployed and used in tandem. By harness-
ing knowledge graph, sentiment analysis, name
screening, named entity recognition, relation ex-
traction, entity linking and link analysis, our sys-
tem can provide different evidence extracted and
analyzed from different data sources to facilitate
human investigators. From the human evaluation
and clients’ feedback, our system can reduce by
30% in terms of human investigation effort.
In the future, we will (1) improve our mod-
els with more domain specific data, and fine tune
the parameters; (2) scale and deploy the system
on cloud-based servers for real-time processing of
large volume of data; (3) tailor the solution and
evaluate it in other domains such as KYC, and (4)
adapt our system to multilingual use cases.
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